Arbitration Law Review
Volume 9 Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation,
Volume 9

Article 4

8-1-2017

YOU ARE NOW ENTERING THE SCHOOL
ZONE, PROCEED WITH CAUTION:
EDUCATORS, ARBITRATION, &
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS
Raquel Muniz
rum232@psu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/arbitrationlawreview
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, Early Childhood Education
Commons, Educational Assessment, Evaluation, and Research Commons, Educational Leadership
Commons, Educational Psychology Commons, Education Law Commons, Elementary and Middle
and Secondary Education Administration Commons, Elementary Education Commons, Family Law
Commons, Juvenile Law Commons, Law and Society Commons, Other Education Commons,
Other Educational Administration and Supervision Commons, Secondary Education Commons,
and the Special Education Administration Commons
Recommended Citation
Raquel Muniz, YOU ARE NOW ENTERING THE SCHOOL ZONE, PROCEED WITH CAUTION: EDUCATORS, ARBITRATION,
& CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, 9 Arb. L. Rev. 197 (2017).

This Student Submission - Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Arbitration Law Review by an authorized editor of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact
ram6023@psu.edu.

YOU ARE NOW ENTERING THE SCHOOL ZONE, PROCEED WITH CAUTION:1 EDUCATORS,
ARBITRATION, & CHILDREN’S RIGHTS
By
Raquel Muñiz*
“ . . . in serving the best interests of the children, we serve the best interests of all
humanity.”– Carol Bellamy, Fourth Executive Director of UNICEF
I. INTRODUCTION
A survey of cases suggests children’s rights have received minimal attention in the
public school labor relations context.2 However, children can be the third parties to
consequences flowing from reinstatement of educators suspended for student-related
disciplinary matters. Collective Bargaining Agreements (“CBAs”) in the primary and
secondary education field are binding contractual agreements detailing employment terms
and conditions (including pay, benefits, termination, and leave policies)3 between
unionized educators (employees) and the school districts (employers).4 Courts have limited
the scope of what public employees may bargain,5 but procedures regarding employee
disciplinary matters are generally negotiable under CBAs.6 These procedures, including

1

Colloquial reference to American school zones, in which drivers must drive at a reduced speed limit and
proceed with caution to avoid harming a child.
*

Raquel Muñiz is an Associate Editor of the Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation, a 2018 Juris Doctor
Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law and a Doctoral Candidate at The
Pennsylvania State University College of Education, Department of Education Policy Studies, Educational
Theory and Policy Program.
2

See discussion infra Section III.A.

See generally Collective Bargaining, AM. FED’N OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUS. ORG.,
http://www.aflcio.org/Learn-About-Unions/Collective-Bargaining (last visited Sept. 16, 2016).
3

See generally Collective Bargaining: What It Is And How It Works, NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N 1,
http://www.nea.org/assets/docs/120701-CBWhatisitandHow-itWorks-3page.pdf (last visited Sept. 16,
2016).
4

5

See, e.g., Sch. Dist. v. Sch. Dist., 199 N.W.2d 752, 759 (Neb. 1972) (noting that boards should not be
required to negotiate managerial prerogatives and matters of public policy).
See, e.g., N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. N.J. Tpk. Supervisors Ass’n, 670 A.2d 1, 11 (N.J. 1996) (holding that procedural
disciplinary measures, including binding arbitration, were negotiable and did not impinge on managerial
prerogatives).
6

arbitration for disciplinary issues, are typically included (and preferred) in private and
public CBAs between unions and employers.7
Arbitration of educator disciplinary matters in primary and secondary schools has
resulted in arbitrators reinstating questionable educators.8 For example, in Colonial
Intermediate Unit #20 v. Colonial Intermediate Unit #20, Education Association,
(“Colonial Intermediate Unit”), the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s
determination that the arbitrator’s award, reinstating a special education teacher, was
“rationally derived from the CBA, and . . . did not violate a well-defined, dominant public
policy.”9 The teacher had a history of humiliating students, calling students names such as
“loser, sissy, liar, knucklehead, crybaby and chubby butt,”10 twisting the students’ arms,
placing students in corners for up to three days, pushing their heads, and placing an “I
Abuse Animals” sign around a student’s neck.11 The Appellate Court found the
“[a]rbitrator determined [the teacher’s] conduct did not constitute immorality, cruelty,
persistent negligence, willful violation of Employer’s directives, or willful neglect of
duties” in violation of the School Code.12 The intermediate unit appealed the decision, but
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied the appeal.13 The arbitrator and the lower courts
in this case did not directly consider the subsequent effects on the students upon
reinstatement of the teacher.14 While the courts cannot engage in speculation, returning a
questionable teacher to the classroom may place current and future students at risk. For
example, a teacher who has difficulty controlling his or her temperament might have an
outburst against the students upon reinstatement.
Arbitrators and courts in these types of cases often focus their analysis on the terms
of the underlying contract, namely the CBA, and other rules and regulations included by
incorporation.15 In other words, the analysis treats the arbitration of educator discipline
matters primarily as a traditional contract interpretation case and does not directly weigh
See generally A Practical Guide to Grievance Arbitration, AM. BAR ASS’N 1 (Dec. 18, 2012),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/basics_papers/nlra/grievance_arbitration.au
thcheckdam.pdf.
7

See, e.g., Colonial Intermediate Unit #20 v. Colonial Intermediate Unit #20 Educ. Ass’n, No. 839 C.D.
2014, 2015 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 103, at *1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Feb. 9, 2015).
8

9

Id. at *2.

10

Id. at *5.

11

Id. at *3-5.

12

Colonial Intermediate Unit #20, 2015 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 103, at *6.

Colonial Intermediate Unit #20 v. Colonial Intermediate Unit #20 Educ. Ass’n, No. 305 MAL 2015, 2015
Pa. LEXIS 2153, at *1 (Pa. Sept. 29, 2015).
13

14

See Colonial Intermediate Unit #20, 2015 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 103, at *1.

15

See id.

the wellbeing of the students. It is true that, for example, when the arbitrator or court
considers whether the teacher’s behavior violated public policy or constituted cruelty
toward children in violation of the governing school code, the arbitrator or court may
encompass the children’s interest in their analysis.16 However, this is only a vicarious
incorporation and results only in indirect benefits, if any at all, to the children.17 The
arbitrator and court are engaging primarily in analysis of substantive contract law
concerning the employee and employer and do not discuss the children’s wellbeing.
The fact that children are minors and that schools act in loco parentis during school
18
hours, warrants a different approach to arbitration in educator discipline cases. For the
reasons stated above, arbitration of disciplinary matters vis-à-vis primary and secondary
public school educators is of a different nature than traditional employee-employer
arbitrable disputes. Public schools should be considered a sui generis category in labor
relations arbitration. Safeguards should be adopted to directly address the children’s wellbeing when determining whether a teacher, suspended for questionable behavior, should
be reinstated to the classroom.
This article first provides background information on CBAs and arbitration clauses
in public employee labor relations contracts to underscore the evolving relationship
between the employer and employees. This background is important to assess the
feasibility of the safeguards proposed later. Next, this article will explore arbitration cases
in school employer-educator union CBAs, focusing particularly on employee disciplinary
matters. Then, this article will explain why primary and secondary public schools should
be categorized as a sui generis sphere in which consequences of arbitrable disciplinary
matters extend beyond the traditional public employer-employee relation. Finally, this
article will propose workable and sustainable safeguards to protect children’s rights in
arbitration of educator discipline cases. After all, though not co-extensive with adult rights,
children have rights, and they do not “shed” them at the “schoolhouse gate.”19
II. BACKGROUND
This section presents a brief history of collective bargaining and arbitration clauses
in CBAs. This information is important because the historical and background information
provides important context on public employer-employee labor relations. The background
illustrates the degree of bargaining power that unions and employers have, the self-interests
both parties bring to the collective bargaining process, and the benefits and limitations both
parties may derive from collective bargaining. This background is the foundation for the
workable, sustainable safeguards proposed.
16

See, e.g., Colonial Intermediate Unit #20, 2015 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 103, at *6-31.

17

Colonial Intermediate Unit #20, 2015 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 103, at *6-31.

See N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985) (“Teachers and school administrators, it is said, act in loco
parentis in their dealings with students: their authority is that of the parent, not the State . . . .”).
18

19

See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969); see also Collective
Bargaining, supra note 3.

A. Brief History on Collective Bargaining
Collective bargaining is the process by which employees, represented collectively
through their unions, negotiate the terms and conditions of their binding, written
employment contract (the CBA) with their employer.20 These labor employment contract
terms include the employees’ “pay, benefits, hours, leave, job health and safety policies,
ways to balance work and family,” and other workplace-related conditions.21
Unionization and collective bargaining in the employment arena trace their roots to
the pre-Revolution era.22 As early as 1741, employees joined collectively to protest labor
issues: New York City bakers quit their jobs and protested the regulation of the price of
bread.23 Other craftsmen employees, including carpenters and shoemakers, also formed
informal unions and crafted primitive, large-scale agreements with their employers in the
years following the bakers’ protest.24 The employees frequently advocated for better
working conditions, such as higher wages, the adoption of a minimum wage rate, and
shorter work hours.25 These organization efforts came to a halt during the depression era
in the late 1830s.26 Large-scale efforts returned during the mid-nineteenth century with
national federations, such as the National Labor Union (1866), the Noble Order of the
Knights of Labor (1869), and the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions
(1881), joining the organized labor arena.27 Despite the growth of organized unions,
employers seldom recognized or tolerated these unions because employers perceived labor
unions as an encroachment on the employers’ managerial powers.28 The employers often
resisted the unionization of employees by employing nonunion employees and assisting in
the prosecution of unions for conspiracy to restrain trade.29

20

See generally ANGELO DENISI & RICKY GRIFFIN, HR (3d ed. 2015) (detailing the collective bargaining
process); see also Collective Bargaining: What It Is And How It Works, supra note 4.
21

See Collective Bargaining, supra note 3.

22

JAMES A. RAPP, EDUCATION LAW, CH. 7, § 7.01 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2016).

23

Id.

24

Id.

U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BRIEF HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 1 (1976),
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/publications/bls/bls_1000_1976.pdf.
25

26

See Rapp, supra note 22, § 7.01.

27

Id.

28

Id.

29

See BRIEF HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT, supra note 25, at 3.

Statutorily formalized collective bargaining has a relatively shorter history.30 In
1935, the United States Congress enacted the Wagner Act,31 which after several
amendments, became known as the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).32 The NLRA
declares the right and outlines the procedure for collective bargaining in the private
sector.33 The NLRA served to restore equality of bargaining power between the employees
and their employers.34
Other major federal pieces of legislation changed and legitimized organized labor
in the United States.35 The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 removed the courts’ power to
enjoin certain union activities.36 The Labor Management Relations Act, also known as the
Taft-Harley Act of 1947, prohibited closed shops that required union membership as a
condition for employment, among other clauses.37 The Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959, also known as the Landrum-Griffin Act, imposed internal union
regulations and democratized labor unions internally by, for example, requiring internal
voting on union decisions.38
Legislatively recognized collective bargaining for state and federal public
employees is a fairly novel concept.39 In 1959, Wisconsin passed the Municipal
Employment Relations Act, granting public employees the right to bargain collectively.40
In 1962, President Kennedy issued Executive Order No. 10,988, granting federal
government employees the right to assemble and bargain collectively.41 Since then, states

30

See generally Steven J. Scott, The Status Quo Doctrine: An Application to Salary Step Increases for
Teachers, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 194 (1997).
31

Wagner Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2016).

32

29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2016).

33

Id.

34

See Collective Bargaining: What It Is And How It Works, supra note 4.

35

See Rapp, supra note 22, § 7.01 (2).

36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Id.

39

See generally Lance Compa, An Overview of Collective Bargaining in the United States, CORNELL
UNIVERSITY
ILR
SCHOOL
91
(2014),
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1925&context=articles.
40

41

See Rapp, supra note 22, § 7.01.

Exec. Order No. 11,988, 3 C.F.R. § 521 (1959-1963), revoked by Exec. Order 11,491, 3 C.F.R. § 861
(1966-1970), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 7101 (1994).

across the nation have adopted similar laws that grant public employees the right to
organize and bargain collectively for their contractual employment terms.42
Educators are among the public employees who resort to collective bargaining
through unions in the workplace.43 The National Education Association (NEA) and the
American Federation of Teachers (AFT) are the two most prominent, active national
teacher unions.44 As of 2007, teachers in 34 states and the District of Columbia, education
support professionals in 32 states, and higher education faculty in 28 states had the right to
bargain.45 On the other hand, six states explicitly prohibited bargaining in public
education.46 Today, most states allow collective bargaining in the public sector, particularly
for public school educators, and at least one state, Missouri, guarantees the right to bargain
collectively in its constitution.47
B. Arbitration Clauses in CBAs
Arbitration clauses are not mandatory in employment contracts, but employers and
unionized employees prefer to include these clauses in their CBAs.48 Employment relation
disputes are generally arbitrable in the United States.49 Arbitration and the grievance
procedure ensure that the contract terms are executed as initially agreed upon.50 Unions
favor arbitration clauses because arbitration allows a neutral third party to determine
whether the management has violated the CBA.51 The management would prefer a
grievance procedure in which the aggrieved educator submits a grievance directly to the
management, without third-party interference.52 The latter rarely occurs, even though
42

See Collective Bargaining: What It Is And How It Works, supra note 4.

43

Id.

44

Rapp, supra note 22, § 7.01.

45

See Collective Bargaining: What It Is And How It Works, supra note 4.

46

Id.

47

Rapp, supra note 22, § 7.01.

See A Practical Guide to Grievance Arbitration, supra note 7, at 1 (“Even today it is the primary method
utilized by public and private employers and unions to solve disputes that arise in the workplace under
labor agreements.”).
48

49

Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
applies to all employment agreements, except for those involving transportation employees).
50

Rapp, supra note 22, § 7.01.

51

See id. § 7.04.

52

Rapp, supra note 22, § 7.04.

arbitration is generally not statutorily mandated, because arbitration is beneficial in many
respects.53 Arbitration offers dispute resolution expediency at a low cost and arbitrators
with expertise on education matters.54
The scope of arbitration agreements included in CBAs is subject to contract law
interpretation and depends on the parties’ intent.55 A dispute in the workplace is not
automatically subject to arbitration, unless “the grievance falls within the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement”56 and the CBA contains an arbitration clause. Pursuant
to axioms of contract law, arbitration contracts are only valid when both parties have agreed
to arbitrate.57 While some courts may have required clear pro-arbitration language in the
contracts in order to uphold arbitration clauses,58 others have extended the federal favorable
arbitration policy59 into public contracts.60
Certain matters are not arbitrable, or in some cases, not even subject to bargaining.61
Educators and their employers are not bound to arbitrate matters specifically excluded from

53

Rapp, supra note 22, § 7.04.

54

See id.

Rapp, supra note 22, § 7.01; see, e.g., Am. Arbitrations Ass’n v. N. Miami Cmty. Sch., 866 N.E.2d 296,
301 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“When determining whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate a dispute, we apply
ordinary contract principles governed by state law.”).
55

56

Bd. of Educ. Of Chi. v. Ill. Educ. Labor Rels. Bd., Nos. 118043, 118072, 2015 Ill. LEXIS 1509, at *9 (Ill.
Dec. 17, 2015).
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583 (1960) (“The
Congress, however, has by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, assigned the courts the duty of
determining whether the reluctant party has breached his promise to arbitrate. For arbitration is a matter of
contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to
submit.”); see also AT&T Techs v. Communs. Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986) (“This [contract
law] axiom recognizes the fact that arbitrators derive their authority to resolve disputes only because the
parties have agreed in advance to submit such grievances to arbitration.”).
57

See, e.g., Am. Arbitrations Ass’n, 866 N.E.2d at 301 (requiring parties to “clear[ly] have agreed to arbitrate”
the issue); see also Acting Superintendent of Sch. of Liverpool Cent. Sch. Dist. v. United Liverpool Faculty
Ass’n, 369 N.E.2d 746, 748 (N.Y. 1977) (“[P]arties will not be held to have chosen arbitration as the forum
for the resolution of their disputes in the absence of an express, unequivocal agreement to that effect; absent
such an explicit commitment neither party may be compelled to arbitrate.”).
58

59

See United Steelworkers of America, 363 U.S. at 582-83.

60

See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Watertown Educ. Ass’n, 710 N.E.2d 1064, 1070 (N.Y. 1999).

61

See generally Deborah Tussey, Annotation, Bargainable or Negotiable Issues in State Public Employment
Labor Relations, 84 A.L.R. 3d 242 (2016); Sch. Dist, 199 N.W.2d at 759 (explaining that managerial
prerogatives and matters of public policy are not negotiable).

arbitration in their CBA62 or excluded by state law.63 Education policy also falls outside
the realm of arbitration.64 Public school education is a state creation,65 and thus the public’s
interest and welfare weighs heavily when courts decide whether a matter is subject to
arbitration.66
III.

ARBITRATING SCHOOL DISCIPLINARY MATTERS

Disciplinary issues are arbitrable in certain jurisdictions.67 This section will focus
on these jurisdictions. For purposes of this article, educator misconduct in school settings
is characterized into two broad categories: (1) in-school misconduct unrelated to students,
for example, failing to follow a supervisor’s directives; or (2) student-related misconduct,
for example, pushing a student against the wall. Because this article focuses primarily on
arbitrable disciplinary matters arising out of an educator’s student-related misconduct, this
section will focus on judicial decisions regarding this type of misconduct. Moreover, this
section will primarily, but not exclusively, include Massachusetts and Pennsylvania cases
to illustrate the issue. This is not because such cases are particular only to Pennsylvania
and Massachusetts. Rather, the choice is due to Pennsylvania’s noteworthy educator
reinstatements and Massachusetts’ legislative developments.68 Because the issue of
62

See, e.g., Karetnikova v. Tr. Of Emerson Coll., 725 F. Supp. 73, 76 (D. Mass 1989) (explaining that, as per
the contract, procedural issues were subject to arbitration and substantive issues could be brought in court);
Sacred Heart Teachers’ Ass’n v. Sacred Heat High Sch. Corp., 782 A.2d 227, 230 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001)
(holding that nonrenewal of temporary employees was not arbitrable because the contract left the final
determination to the superintendent).
63

See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 2015 Ill. LEXIS 1509, at *28 (explaining that a school district is not obligated
to arbitrate matters not arbitrable under state law); see also Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Ill. Educ.
Labor Relations Bd., 778 N.E.2d 1232, 1236 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (noting that matters “that cannot be the
subject of a collective bargaining agreement also cannot be arbitrated.”).
See, e.g., Sch. Comm. of Boston v. Boston Teachers Union, 363 N.E.2d 485, 490 (Mass. 1977) (“[In cases]
in which the ingredient of educational policy is so comparatively heavy . . . even voluntary arbitration would
be excluded.”); see also Reg’l Sch. Unit No. 5 v. Coastal Educ. Ass’n, 121 A.3d 98, 102-05 (Me. 2015) (The
court rejected the arbitrators’ holding because the matter arbitrated, whether teachers were contractually
required to be in their classrooms, was a matter of educational policy. The court held that teachers were
required to be in their classrooms at certain times as a matter of educational policy because the teachers’
presence promotes student safety, among other reasons.).
64

65

See infra note 171.

66

See generally Rapp, supra note 22, § 7.01; United Teachers of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Unified Sch.
Dist., 278 P.3d 1204, 1207 (Cal. 2012); Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 2015 Ill. LEXIS, at *1; Raines v. Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 6, 796 P.2d 303, 303 (Okla. 1990); Central Falls Sch. Dist. Bd. of Tr. v. Central Falls Teachers
Union, No. PC 2014-6275, 2015 R.I. Super. LEXIS 110, at *1 (Super. Ct. R.I. Aug. 28, 2015).
See Rapp, supra note 22, § 7.01; but see Roger Williams Univ. Faculty Ass’n v. Roger Williams Univ., 14
F. Supp. 3d 27, 28 (D.R.I. 2014) (holding that a university faculty disciplinary matter was not arbitrable).
67

68

See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 42 (LexisNexis 2016).

children’s rights is a present concern regarding the current arbitrability of disciplinary
matters, this section will only discuss arbitration cases available from 2000 onward.
A. Contemporary Examples of Arbitral Awards and Judicial Review
Judicial review of arbitral awards provides limited but valuable insight into the
traditionally-private arbitration proceedings.69 Arbitral awards remain subject to judicial
review, for example, to confirm or vacate an award.70 These awards may not be
representative of all arbitral awards because most awards are private.71 But as illustrated
below, these awards offer insight into trends in arbitral proceedings and judicial review of
arbitral proceedings.
As exemplified in this section, within the last fifteen years, arbitration awards in
the public labor relations context have been largely favorable to employees facing adverse
employment consequences. Some court opinions have focused on the protection of the
public welfare.72 However, as illustrated below, most of the analysis addressed children’s
rights vicariously, not directly. Two themes were prevalent. First, in cases where the
educators’ misconduct was physical in nature, the arbitrators often reinstated the educators
and the courts upheld the arbitrators’ awards. Second, in cases where the educators’
misconduct was sexual in nature, the arbitrators often reinstated the educators but,
depending on the severity of the sexual misconduct and the amount of evidence weighing
against the educators, the courts overturned the arbitrators’ awards.
1. Physical Misconduct
The survey of the cases yielded cases in which educators used physical force against
students, and the arbitrators and courts often reinstated the educators. In the first case,
School District of Kewaskum v. Kewaskum Education Association, the school district
terminated a special education teacher’s employment after several students complained that
she used excessive physical force against four students.73 The arbitrator, as the fact-finder,
determined that the substantiated physical contact was permissible and incidental.74
Relying heavily on the arbitrator’s findings, the court held that the arbitrator’s award did
See Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 518 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Confidentiality is a natural
outgrowth of the status of arbitrations as private alternatives to government-sponsored proceedings.”).
69

70

9 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11 (2016).

71

See Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 733 F.3d at 518.

See, e.g., Neshaminy Sch. Dist. v. Neshaminy Fed’n of Teachers, No. 2015-04458, 2016 Pa. Dist. & Cnty.
Dec. LEXIS 185, *20-28 (Pa. C.P. May 4, 2016).
72

73

Sch. Dist. of Kewaskum v. Kewaskum v. Educ. Ass’n, 840 N.W.2d 719, 721 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013).

74

Id. at 722.

not violate the law or public policy, was not immoral and did not lead to an environment
that endangered the students’ mental or physical well-being because the contact was
permissible and incidental.75
In a second case, Rose Tree Media Secretaries & Educational Support Personnel
Ass’n v. Rose Tree Media School District, the arbitrator reinstated a special education
teacher who dragged a special needs student from outside the classroom to his desk because
the student did not want to enter the classroom.76 The arbitrator found the situation to be a
reprehensible one-time incident that did not violate public policy and was outweighed by
the teacher’s track record.77 The court held that the arbitrator derived its decision from the
essence of the CBA, and the arbitral award did not violate public policy.78
In a third case, Mayberry v. DOD Dependents Schools Europe, the school
terminated a first grade teacher after a parent complained that the teacher had harmed a
student when the teacher lifted the student by the arms, pulling the student forcibly away
from the student’s chair.79 Some students used the words “grabbed,” “yanked,” “shook,”
and “hit” to describe what the teacher continuously did to other students.80 But, other
students claimed to adore the teacher.81 The teacher admitted some of the allegations to the
arbitrator, who upheld the teacher’s dismissal.82 The court, however, reinstated the teacher
because the CBA’s contractual terms required progressive discipline of teachers.83 The
three cases described in this section illustrate the potential difficulty for school districts to
dismiss educators in cases involving the use of physical force.

75

Sch. Dist. of Kewaskum, 840 N.W.2d at 724. Although the opinion does not detail the behavior at issue,
the Milwaukee, Wisconsin Journal Sentinel, a local online news medium, reported that the children alleged
the teacher pinched students’ necks and shoulder areas, pulled the students’ arms, and pushed children into
their chairs. See Arthur Thomas, Kewaskum School District Asks Court to Uphold Teacher’s Firing,
MILWAUKEE
WISCONSIN,
JOURNAL
SENTINEL
(July
13,
2012),
http://archive.jsonline.com/news/ozwash/kewaskum-school-district-asks-court-to-uphold-teachers-firingvr6486t-162424116.html?page=1.
Rose Tree Media Sec’ys & Educ. Support Pers. Ass’n v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 136 A.3d 1069, 1072
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016).
76

77

Rose Tree Media Sec’ys & Educ. Support Pers. Ass’n, 136 A.3d at 1074.

78

Id. at 1080.

79

Mayberry v. DOD Dependents Schs. Eur., 500 Fed. Appx. 935, 936 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

80

Id. at 937.

81

Id.

82

Id. at 938-41.

83

Id. at 940.

2. Sexual Misconduct
The cases involving sexually-related misconduct varied by severity based on
whether the educator in any given case had direct contact with the students, had multiple
allegations of sexual misconduct, or showed remorse. The three features were not mutually
exclusive. For example, in Cedar Education Association v. Cedarburg Board of
Education,84 the Wisconsin Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s confirmation of an
arbitral award reinstating a teacher who watched pornographic material during school
hours on a school computer.85 Even though the educator did not come into sexual contact
with the students, the educator’s behavior was likely contrary to what students and parents
expected from a school teacher and role model.86 While the arbitrator found that a single
incident in an otherwise unblemished eleven-year career did not merit dismissal,87 the
Appellate Court reasoned that when a teacher engages in immoral behavior on school
grounds, which violates public policy, the court must vacate the arbitral award pursuant to
state law.88 The statute mandated that the court vacate an award when the arbitrator has
exceeded his powers, and here the arbitrator exceeded his powers when he issued an award
in violation of public policy.89
Similarly, in 2001, in Fort Wayne Education Ass’n v. Fort Wayne Community
Schools, the school terminated a long-serving substitute teacher who, while supervising a
basketball practice, approached a female student, placed his hands inside his shorts, and
told the student that he did not like the new underwear he was wearing. 90 A few minutes
later, he proceeded to tell her that he wanted to show her something “cool” but that she
could not tell her parents, and then showed her his pierced nipple.91 He eventually

Cedarburg Educ. Ass’n v. Cedarburg Bd. of Educ., No. 2007AP852, 2008 Wisc. App. LEXIS 560, at *1
(Wis. Ct. App. July 23, 2008).
84

85

Id. at *11.

86

See, e.g., Parent, Student, and Teacher Expectations, TUSCANO ELEMENTARY SCH.,
http://tusc.fesd.org/staff_websites/special_education/mrs__czoka/parent__student__and_teacher_expectatio
ns/ (last visited May 7, 2017) (“Teachers are expected to help students by: . . . showing that they care about
all students, having high expectations for themselves and students, [and] providing a safe and supportive
learning environment.”); Teachers as Role Models, TEACH, https://teach.com/what/teachers-changelives/teachers-are-role-models/ (last visited May 7, 2017) (“A role model can be anybody: a parent, a sibling,
a friend but some of our most influential and life-changing role models are teachers.”).
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apologized for making her feel uncomfortable.92 The arbitrator reinstated him, concluding
that the penalty was too severe for the misconduct.93 The Appellate Court determined that
the arbitrator did not modify the CBA, exceeding his powers94 in violation of state law,95
and did not manifestly disregard the law by concluding that the substitute teacher did not
act immorally.96 Rather, the arbitrator simply interpreted the school code as best the
arbitrator could.97 Here, the misconduct, while inappropriate, did not constitute sexual
harassment as defined in the school code.98 Therefore, the substitute’s reinstatement on the
middle school’s list of available substitute teachers and partial back pay was merited.99 The
court in City School District of the City of New York v. McGraham also reinstated the
educator, upholding an arbitral award, which suspended but did not terminate a high school
teacher who had attempted to pursue an intimate relationship with one of her students,100
because she expressed remorse and willingness to change.101 The dissenting judge
expressed his concern about returning the teacher to school because this would pose a risk
to future students.102 The court in Neshaminy School District v. Neshaminy Federation of
Teachers, reached an opposite outcome and held that the arbitral award reinstating a
teacher who used sexually-charged language toward his teaching assistant in front of his

92

Id.
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Fort Wayne Educ. Ass’n, 753 N.E.2d at 675.

Id. at 677 (The trial court held the arbitrator modified the CBA by precluding the teacher’s termination
under any circumstance. The Appellate court reversed.).
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IND. CODE ANN. § 34-57-2-13(a) (LexisNexis 2016) (providing narrow grounds for vacating an award
when the arbitrator exceeds his or her powers).
Fort Wayne Educ. Ass’n, 753 N.E.2d. at 679 (“[The substitute teacher’s] conduct, as explained above, was
an isolated incident--not a course of conduct. Moreover, it does not rise to the level of conviction for any
offense, let alone the serious sex offenses listed in Indiana Code section 20-6.1-4-10(a)(6) and cited by [the
school]. The arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law in concluding that [the substitute teacher’s]
conduct was not immoral.”).
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Id. at 680 (The Appellate Court ordered the substitute teacher’s reinstatement only on the list because the
Court found that the arbitrator had exceeded his power in ordering reinstatement of the substitute teacher for
the following academic year. The Court stated, “[The substitute teacher], as a long-term substitute, had no
‘rights’ or ‘security’ for the succeeding academic year, except that he not be replaced by another substitute
teacher without cause.”).
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City Sch. Dist. of the City of N.Y. v. McGraham, 905 N.Y.S.2d 86, 90-91 (App. Div. 2010).
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Id. at 93.

102

Id. at 93-97 (Acosta, J., dissenting).

students violated public policy103 because sexual harassment in the workplace is not
permissible104 and the reinstatement would result in continued exposure to the sexuallysuggestive bantering.105
The remainder of the cases involved educators who came in direct contact with the
students. Some courts and arbitrators have been more willing to vacate or modify an arbitral
award or school district decision when the teacher misconduct is sexually-related and
sufficient evidence supports the claims.106 In Bethel Park School District v. Bethel Park
Federation of Teachers, the district terminated a seventh-grade mathematics teacher’s
employment after learning the teacher had engaged in inappropriate contact with several
female students, holding their hands and rubbing their backs or legs when he would help
them with their math homework.107 The Court held that the arbitrator did not rationally
derive the decision from the CBA when reinstating the teacher but rather reached his own
conclusion unsupported by the CBA.108 Moreover, the arbitral award violated “welldefined and established public policy of protecting students from sexual harassment during
school hours, on school property” as defined in the District’s policy against unlawful
harassment.109 This case merited the use of the narrow public policy exception.110
Similarly, in East Bridgwater [sic] Public Schools, the school dismissed a teacher who
asked a young girl to sit on his lap and then proceeded to place his hand directly on her
private areas.111 Even though the conduct was serious, the arbitrator warned that he would
have to reinstate the teacher if he found the reinstatement would be in the best interests of
the students, as required by the Massachusetts teacher dismissal statute.112 However,
because the District proved with substantial evidence that the teacher continued asking
103

Neshaminy Sch. Dist., 2016 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 185, at *20.
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Neshaminy Sch. Dist., 2016 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 185, at *21-24.
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Id. at *26.
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See, e.g., Bethel Park Sch. Dist. v. Bethel Park Fed’n. of Teachers, 55 A.3d 154, 161-62 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2012). Some arbitrators have gone further and not required direct evidence of current misconduct against
students. For example, in Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 196 F. Supp. 2d 229, 242 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), the arbitrator
terminated the high school teacher’s employment after determining that the teacher’s membership in the
North American Man-Boy Love Association (NAMBLA), which promotes sexual activity between adult
males and boys in possible violation of New York Statutes, would reasonably interfere with his ability to
provide a “valid educational experience” for the students.
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MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 42 (LexisNexis 2016).

young children to sit on his lap after being warned to stop, the teacher’s misconduct
outweighed the teacher’s “impressive” classroom results.113 In Bonang v. New Haven
Board of Education, a Connecticut arbitrator also terminated a teacher’s employment after
determining that the teacher had a long history of inappropriate sexual behavior and
reprimands against such behavior.114 The Court affirmed the award.115
The courts in two court cases described the reinstatement of the educators, even
though the educators came in direct contact with the students. First, in D.C.G. & P.J.G. v.
Wilson Area School District, the arbitrator reinstated the teacher with back pay and
benefits.116 The court’s analysis did not provide great detail on the arbitration proceedings
because the claim before the court was a constitutional claim. However, the opinion
describes allegations that he had touched a student’s shoulders and neck, played with her
hair, continually complimented her on her physical appearance, asked her whether she had
“slept around with guys,” and cupped her breasts, to name a few incidents.117 Several other
females came forward to make similar accusations after the first student.118 Second, in
Franklin Regional School District v. Franklin Regional Education Association, the District
terminated an elementary teacher after several female students accused him of touching
them while they attended his music lessons.119 The arbitrator reinstated the teacher because
he found the teacher more credible than the young students and because the Police
department and Westmoreland County Children and Youth Services did not proceed with
the case.120 The cases in this section illustrate a variety of outcomes. The results vary, in
part, because the claims and the claims’ elements before the arbitrators and courts are
different.
B. Discussion of Contemporary Trends in Public Relations Arbitration
Proceedings
None of the cases discussed above describe the arbitrator’s direct analysis of the
children’s rights or the potential risk of harm to other students upon reinstatement of the
113
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Bonang v. New Haven Bd. of Educ., No. CV094039902S, 2011 Conn. Super. LEXIS 862, at *4, *30
(Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 1, 2011).
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D.C.G. & P.J.G. v. Wilson Area Sch. Dist., No. 07-cv-1357, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26446, at *7 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 25, 2009).
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Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist. v. Franklin Reg’l Educ. Ass’n, No. 114 C.D. 2015, No. 147 C.D. 2015, 2016
Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 33, at *3-5. (Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan. 7, 2016).
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Id. at *5.

teachers.121 Instead, the cases presented above illustrate the arbitrators’ willingness to
reinstate teachers subject to disciplinary proceedings if the teachers have no prior
disciplinary records.122 The analyses sometimes focus on whether the districts followed the
proper disciplinary procedures outlined in the CBA123 and, if so, whether reinstatement
would violate a well-defined public policy.124
The cases presented above represent the cases in which reinstatement is difficult.125
While the educator may have behaved inappropriately, in some cases, the educator has an
exemplary track record.126 The cases also demonstrate that CBAs often require progressive
discipline (e.g., providing warnings, an opportunity to improve, and short suspensions) and
other notification requirements (e.g., providing a written letter notifying the teacher of the
charges) prior to full employment termination.127 Notwithstanding the CBA clauses, the
schools often terminate the employees after the first instance of egregious misconduct.128
However difficult these cases may be, arbitrators and the courts should consider children’s
rights in their analyses.
Children’s rights are not at the forefront of arbitration proceedings or the courts’
analyses of educators’ dismissal disputes, but are rather an afterthought, if present at all.
Largely, neither the arbitrator nor the courts directly consider the risk to students when
reinstating a teacher who has engaged in serious student-related misconduct.129 First, the
arbitrators’ analyses focus on the CBA and whether the educator violated the school code
See discussion supra Section III.A (discussing the arbitrators’ and courts’ analyses, none of which
included direct extensive discussions on children’s rights or the potential risk to other students upon
reinstatement).
121
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E.g., Rose Tree Media Sec’ys & Educ. Support Pers. Ass’n, 136 A.3d at 1074.
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E.g., Mayberry, 500 Fed. Appx. at 940.

See Neshaminy Sch. Dist., 2016 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 185, at *20; Cedarburg Educ. Ass’n, 2008
Wisc. App. LEXIS 560, at *14; Sch. Dist. of Kewaskum, 840 N.W.2d at 724; Rose Tree Media Sec’ys &
Educ. Support Pers. Ass’n, 136 A.3d at 1080; Bethel Park Sch. Dist., 55 A.3d at 160-61.
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See generally discussion supra Section III.A.

E.g., Rose Tree Media Sec’ys & Educ. Support Pers. Ass’n, 136 A.3d at 1074; Cedarburg Educ. Ass’n,
2008 Wisc. App. LEXIS 560, at *12.
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E.g., Mayberry, 500 Fed. Appx. at 940.

Sch. Dist. of Kewaskum, 840 N.W.2d at 721; Rose Tree Media Sec’ys & Educ. Support Pers. Ass’n, 136
A.3d at 1072; Mayberry, 500 Fed. Appx. at 938; City Sch. Dist. of the City of N.Y., 905 N.Y.S.2d at 89-90;
Neshaminy Sch. Dist., 2016 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 185, at *2; Bethel Park Sch. Dist., 55 A.3d at 158;
East Bridgwater [sic] Public Schools, 11-390-02251-01 (2002) (Dunn, Arb); Bonang, 2011 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 862, at *4, *30; Wilson Area Sch. Dist., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26446, at *7; Franklin Reg’l Sch.
Dist., 2016 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 33, at *3-5.
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See discussion supra Section III.A (describing the issues the arbitrators and courts considered in these
cases and illustrating that arbitrators and judges generally do not fully consider the risk posed to other students
upon the educators’ reinstatement).

or any other statutory mandates130 or whether the district has sufficient grounds, or just
cause, to terminate the employee.131 Generally, the just cause requirement demands more
than a single incident, even if the incident is egregious.132 Second, the cases above
demonstrate that the courts, in reviewing arbitral awards, have largely remained deferential
to arbitration awards, vacating awards only on limited occasions, such as when the award
contravenes a narrowly-defined public policy.133
Public policy and other related exceptions134 offer the only opportunities for
arbitrators and courts to consider the children’s rights, but these exceptions are not enough.
For example, in Pennsylvania, a court reviewing an arbitral award in a teacher dismissal
case due to in-school, student-related misconduct is primarily concerned with whether the
arbitral award rationally flows from the CBA.135 In other words, the court first determines
whether the arbitrator interpreted the contract properly and whether the arbitrator exceeded
his or her power as granted by the CBA. It is only after this analysis that the court
determines whether the arbitral award violates public policy.136 In addition, the public
policy must be well-defined, not simply represent normative value judgments of what
should be considered public policy.137 The cases show that this is a difficult burden to
meet.138 Moreover, even when the parties meet the burden, the public policy analysis tends
to focus on how the reinstatement of the teacher would affect the workplace environment,
not how the reinstatement would affect the children under the educator’s care.139 If the
130
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See, e.g., Cedarburg Educ. Ass’n, 2008 Wisc. App. LEXIS 560, at *14; Neshaminy Sch. Dist., 2016 Pa.
Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 185, at *20.
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See, e.g., Fort Wayne Educ. Ass’n, 753 N.E.2d. at 679 (discussing “manifest disregard of the law” as an
exception to upholding arbitral awards).
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See, e.g., Colonial Intermediate Unit #20, 2015 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 103, at *10-21.
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See, e.g., id. at *21-31; Rose Tree Media Sec’ys & Educ. Support Pers. Ass’n, 136 A.3d at 1071.
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See, e.g., Colonial Intermediate Unit #20, 2015 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 103, at *10; Sch. Dist. of
Kewaskum, 840 N.W.2d at 722; Rose Tree Media Sec’ys & Educ. Support Pers. Ass’n, 136 A.3d at 1071;
Cedarburg Educ. Ass’n, 2008 Wisc. App. LEXIS 560, at *7-8; Neshaminy Sch. Dist., 2016 Pa. Dist. & Cnty.
Dec. LEXIS 185, at *17-18, 20-21; Bethel Park Sch. Dist., 55 A.3d at 160-61.
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See, e.g., Colonial Intermediate Unit #20, 2015 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 103, at *10; Sch. Dist. of
Kewaskum, 840 N.W.2d at 722; Rose Tree Media Sec’ys & Educ. Support Pers. Ass’n, 136 A.3d at 1071;
Cedarburg Educ. Ass’n, 2008 Wisc. App. LEXIS 560, at *7-8; Neshaminy Sch. Dist., 2016 Pa. Dist. & Cnty.
Dec. LEXIS 185, at *17-18, 20-21; Bethel Park Sch. Dist., 55 A.3d at 160-61; see also discussion infra
Section III.C.
See, e.g., Neshaminy Sch. Dist., 2016 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 185, at *27-28 (“Appellant further
complains that this Court erred in finding that the arbitration decision was a violation of a dominant public
policy against immoral conduct. However, we did not make any such finding in granting Appellee’s Petition
139

district succeeds in showing that the arbitral award violates public policy, the children will
benefit. For example, a teacher who lacks self-control would no longer be in the classroom
with the students.
The cases described above present an issue of focus. As discussed in this section,
children’s rights rarely play an important role in the analysis, and when the arbitrators or
courts discuss the children’s rights during arbitration or court proceedings, they often
discuss the rights only minimally, as an afterthought, or only vicariously. The particular
vulnerabilities of primary and secondary students and the importance of providing a safe
education environment140 demands that children’s rights play a major role in the arbitration
or judicial analysis.
The following section highlights how the judicial branch can play a strong role in
reviewing arbitral awards after an arbitrator has rendered a decision. When a court directly
considers the best interests of the students, the students benefit directly. However, not all
arbitral awards will undergo judicial review because of arbitration’s private nature.141
C. Recent Developments in the Public School Labor Relations Context
Recent developments in different states are beginning to shape the interpretation of
public employer-employee contractual relations in arbitration cases. Some states have
taken a strong stance, prohibiting collective bargaining of public employee disciplinary
matters or granting public employers the right to not bargain disciplinary matters if the
employers so desire.142 In contrast, Massachusetts has adopted a teacher dismissal
and thereby vacating the arbitration award. The arbitration award was vacated solely due to its unacceptable
risk of violating a dominant public policy against sexual harassment in the classroom . . . .”).
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633-34 (1979) (“[Children have the] inability to make critical decisions
in an informed mature manner . . . .”); Eddings v. Okla., 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982), superseded by statute, 21
Okl. S. § 701.13 (explaining that minors “lack experience, perspective, and judgment expected of adults”);
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (“[Children] have limited ‘contro[l] over their own
environment’ and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings.”).
140

See Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 733 F.3d at 518 (“Confidentiality is a natural outgrowth of the status of
arbitrations as private alternatives to government-sponsored proceedings.”).
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See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 111.70 (4) (mb) (2017) (The statute states, in pertinent part, “The municipal
employer is prohibited from bargaining collectively with a collective bargaining unit containing a general
municipal employee with respect to the following: 1. Any factor or condition of employment except wages .
. . .”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.08 (C)(5) (LexisNexis 2017) (“Unless a public employer agrees
otherwise in a collective bargaining agreement, nothing in Chapter 4117 of the Revised Code impairs the
right and responsibility of each public employer to: . . . (5) Suspend, discipline, demote, or discharge for just
cause, or lay off, transfer, assign, schedule, promote, or retain employees . . . .”); CAL. GOV’T CODE §
3543.2(b) (Deering 2017) (“[T]he public school employer and the exclusive representative shall, upon
request of either party, meet and negotiate regarding causes and procedures for disciplinary action, other than
dismissal, including suspension of pay for up to 15 days, affecting certificated employees.”) (emphasis
added); D.C. CODE § 1-617.08 (a)(2)-(3), (a-1) (2017) (“The respective personnel authorities (management)
shall retain the sole right, in accordance with applicable law and rules and regulations: . . . (2) to hire, promote,
transfer, assign, retain employees in positions within the agency and to suspend, demote, discharge, or take
other disciplinary action against employees for cause; (3) To relieve employees of duties because of lack of
work or other legitimate reasons . . . (a-1) An act, exercise, or agreement of the respective personnel
142

statute.143 The statute allows district superintendents to dismiss teachers and provides the
procedures that the district must follow when dismissing the district employee.144 The
practical effects of the statute have proven effective vis-à-vis children’s rights because the
statute requires that the arbitrator “consider the best interests of the pupils.”145 Moreover,
judicial review of the teacher dismissal statute is less deferential than the review of arbitral
awards arising out of the CBAs because the Court has the jurisdiction to interpret statutes
de novo.146 Within the last fifteen years, after the enactment of the statute, the
Massachusetts courts’ judicial review of arbitral awards has shifted toward an emphasis on
the children’s best interests, as illustrated in the following two cases.147
In School District v. Geller, the principal suspended the teacher for “conduct
unbecoming a teacher” after determining that, on three separate occasions, the teacher
pushed three students against the wall while screaming at the students.148 The arbitrator
described the behavior as inappropriate, but after considering the teacher’s twenty years of
experience, lack of prior disciplinary record, and previous positive evaluations, concluded
that the teacher should be reinstated because reinstatement was in the “best interests” of
the students.149
The judges in the Supreme Court of Massachusetts did not write a majority
opinion.150 Instead, the judges on the Court wrote two concurrences offering the following
two distinct focuses: (1) the teacher dismissal statute, and (2) the violation of public

authorities (management) shall not be interpreted in any manner as a waiver of the sole management rights .
. .”).
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§ 42.

145

See, e.g., Sch. Dist. v. Geller, 755 N.E.2d 1241, 1250 (Mass. 2001).

Id. at 1246 (“Where the determinations to be made are primarily issues of public law, the arbitrator
possesses no special expertise. Hence, the responsibility for interpreting the meaning of [the statute], and the
scope of the arbitrator’s authority thereunder remains with the court. It cannot be ceded to the arbitrator by
agreement of the parties, and has not been ceded to the arbitrator in the statute.”) (internal citations omitted).
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Geller, 755 N.E.2d 1241; Sch. Comm. of Lexington v. Zagaeski, 12 N.E.3d 384 (Mass. 2014). Cf. City of
Worcester v. Worcester Vocational Teachers Ass’n, No. 98-1686B, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 75, at *5
(Mass. Super. Ct. 1999) (noting the deferential standard when reviewing arbitral awards, the Court dismissed
the city and school’s complaint and reemphasized that “[a]bsent fraud, the court’s inquiry is confined to the
question [of] whether the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his reference or awarded relief in excess of his
authority.” (quoting Sch. Comm. of Waltham v. Waltham Educators Ass’n, 500 N.E.2d 1312, 1314 (Mass.
1986))).
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Geller, 755 N.E.2d at 1243 (Cordy, J., concurring).
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Id. at 1244.
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See generally id.

policy.151 Judge Cordy, in the first concurrence, argued that the arbitral award violated the
dismissal statute.152 Judge Cordy recognized that the arbitrator derived his authority from
the CBA, but emphasized that the authority to arbitrate a teacher dismissal case now derives
from the statute.153 Judge Cordy explained that the arbitrator exceeded his authority when
the arbitrator weighed the teacher’s experience against the severity of the punishment
because the statute provides a list of grounds for dismissal that do not permit additional
analysis.154 Judge Cordy further noted: “to improve the education provided to the students
in the classrooms of our public schools . . . [The] statute is not only about the relationship
between the employer and employee, it is about the education of students.”155
In the second concurrence, Judge Ireland asserted that the award should be vacated
because the award violated public policy.156 Massachusetts has a strong public policy
against teachers using physical force against students. Judge Ireland explained that the
reinstatement was not merited because the teacher “pushed, shoved, jabbed, dragged,
knocked down, . . . slammed into a locker,” and bruised three sixth-graders. Judge Ireland
remained cognizant of the strong policy requiring the Court to remain “heav[ily]”
deferential to arbitration awards, avoiding the “judicializ[ation]” of the arbitration process.
But, Judge Ireland explained that Massachusetts has a strong policy to protect the children
of Massachusetts, and the teacher’s conduct was antithetical to his duties as a teacher;
accordingly, the misconduct violated the public policy.157
Judge Ireland emphasized several key points. The teacher’s misconduct went
directly to the crux of the teacher’s duties because the teacher is tasked with creating a safe
environment conducive to student growth.158 The reinstatement of a teacher who used
physical force against his students would be absolutely inappropriate.159 Judge Ireland
condemned the teacher reinstatement stating, “Where the court must balance two
competing policies, i.e., one favoring arbitration and one protecting our children, I do not
hesitate to conclude that the latter outweighs the former.”160
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In 2014, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court addressed the scope of the
arbitrator’s authority under the teacher dismissal statute in School Committee of Lexington
v. Zagaeski.161 In Zagaeski, the Court vacated the arbitral award that reinstated a teacher
who jokingly told his female student that she could not pay for better grades with anything
else other than sexual favors.162 The Court emphasized that teachers hold an important
position of public trust and children rely on adults to use sound judgment, draw appropriate
boundaries when necessary,163 and have a right to be free from sexual harassment.164
Returning the teacher to the classroom would be at odds with the purpose of the statute to
create an educational setting in which students’ self-esteem is protected.165 Moreover, a
teacher has the duty to prepare children to become responsible citizens in a democracy, and
a student who witnesses sexual harassment in the classroom may learn that such conduct
is not only acceptable, but should be modeled.166 Here, the arbitrator erred because the
statute required that when determining whether to dismiss a teacher who creates an unsafe
environment for the students, the arbitrator must consider the “best interests of the pupils,”
not the teacher’s track record.167 The District rightfully dismissed him.168
These Massachusetts cases illustrate how judicial review can allow courts to
consider the best interests of the students after the arbitrator has rendered an award. This
trend in Massachusetts deviates from the traditional deferential review of arbitral awards
as illustrated in Section III.A,169 but is justified because the primary and secondary
education field is of a sui generis nature.170
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Id. at 396 (“[The teacher’s] conduct undermined these policies, as well as one of the central purposes of
the Reform Act: to ensure an educational setting that safeguards, rather than warps, a child’s self-esteem.”);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 69, § 1 (LexisNexis 2017) (“It is therefore the intent of this title to ensure: . . . (1) that
each public school classroom provides the conditions for all pupils to engage fully in learning as an inherently
meaningful and enjoyable activity without threats to their sense of security or self-esteem . . . .”).
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IV.

CHILDREN’S RIGHTS IN PUBLIC SCHOOL ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
A. Primary and Secondary Education as a Sui Generis Sphere

Given that the United States Constitution does not explicitly mention education, the
states are primarily responsible for regulating matters related to education.171 Today, all
states not only provide primary and secondary public school education for all school-age
children, but have compulsory attendance laws.172 In 2008, children in public schools spent
an average of 6.64 hours per day at school, or 1,195 hours. 173 Some have categorized
education as the most important government duty.174
1. Children Have Special Characteristics Rendering Them Vulnerable
The law has traditionally regarded children as a population that requires special
considerations.175 In Bellotti v. Baird, the Supreme Court succinctly stated:
Children have a very special place in life which law should reflect. Legal
theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to fallacious reasoning
if uncritically transferred to determination of a State’s duty towards
children. The unique role in our society of the family, the institution by
which “we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values,
moral and cultural,” requires that constitutional principles be applied with
sensitivity and flexibility to the special needs of parents and children. We
have recognized three reasons justifying the conclusion that the
constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults: the
peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions
in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in
child rearing.176

U.S. CONST. amend. X. (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”).
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In 1982, the United States Supreme Court reemphasized the vulnerability of
children when deciding Eddings v. Oklahoma, explaining that “during the formative years
of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment
expected of adults.”177 In 2012, the Supreme Court again noted the vulnerability of
children.178 In Miller v. Alabama, the Court first recognized that children “lack . . .
maturity” and have an “underdeveloped sense of responsibility.”179 The Court then noted
that “children ‘are more vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside pressures,’
including from their family and peers; they have limited ‘contro[l] over their own
environment’ and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing
settings.”180 Finally the Court noted that “a child’s character is not as ‘well formed’ as an
adult’s.”181
These cases are illustrative of the law’s view of children. Children are a special
population with particular vulnerabilities attributed to the children’s underdevelopment.
Their vulnerabilities and underdevelopment make them dependent on their caregivers, for
protection from harm and child rearing.182 As discussed below, the schools that children
attend owe children certain responsibilities.
2. School In Loco Parentis
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that schools act in loco parentis
when children attend school.183 This does not mean that the school has a constitutional
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“duty to protect” the children.184 Rather, the children’s rights in the school context are
restricted by the school’s interest in control over the students and safety for all.185 Schools
do not simply substitute the parents’ role along with all duties and responsibilities.
Primary and secondary educators play a special role during the school hours when
they have direct contact with children.186 In Cobb v. W. Va Human Rights, West Virginia’s
Supreme Court of Appeals explained the principle: “‘[T]eachers are not merely instructors
in sciences and letters. They are authority figures, role models, behavioral examples,
surrogate parents.’ . . . [W]e hold, West Virginia public school teachers and school
administrators stand in loco parentis to their students.”187
The vulnerability and mental underdevelopment of these children warrants the
categorization of primary and secondary education as a sui generis sphere. Primary and
secondary public school students become vulnerable third parties of public employeremployee arbitration disputes if the educator returns to the classroom with the students.
The students’ vulnerable position implies that safeguards such as the ones detailed in the
next section must be in place to protect students.
B. Children as Third Party Recipients of School-Educator Arbitration Agreements
Vis-à-vis Discipline Matters
Upon review of the children’s vulnerabilities188 and the school’s in loco parentis
role during school hours,189 one can conclude that negative situations occurring in school
settings can have a detrimental effect on students. For example, a teacher who continuously
humiliates students, like the teacher in Colonial Intermediate Unit,190 presents a special
threat to the students’ the wellbeing. Although CBAs are contractual in nature, jurisdictions
can implement safeguards that respect freedom of contract in a manner that is considerate
of children’s rights.
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V. WORKABLE & SUSTAINABLE SAFEGUARDS
AGREEMENTS

FOR

SCHOOL-EDUCATOR ARBITRATION

This section will propose three major potential safeguards that can be implemented
in the school-educator arbitration procedures to mitigate or avoid potential unintended,
negative consequences on students after an educator is reinstated. Proposed safeguards
must be both workable and sustainable to ensure success. After introducing each potential
safeguard, this section will analyze the workability and sustainability of each alternative.
Each potential safeguard has its strengths and weaknesses.
Recognizing that education is within the states’ spheres,191 and that education
operates within a loose-coupling system,192 this section presents the strengths and
weakness of all three potential solutions and urges jurisdictions to adopt one or a
combination of the three safeguards that are feasible and best account for the jurisdiction’s
particular needs. While the analysis presented below is comprehensive, different
jurisdictions may find that the analysis is not exhaustive. Jurisdictions should weigh
additional considerations not listed herein. Ultimately, the safeguard(s) adopted should be
the closest to an ideal solution for the jurisdiction and should recognize and consider the
children’s rights. Ideally, jurisdictions will adopt the most feasible safeguard and will
incrementally allocate more responsibility to other key players, namely, the judiciary and
legislative branch, the arbitrators, and the public employer and employee.
A. Legislative and Judicial Safeguards: Independent and Concerted Efforts
1. Proposed Safeguards
Legislatures may adopt any of the following proposals. First, the state legislatures
that have not done so can enact laws that make public employees disciplinary matters nonbargainable.193 Some states’ legislatures have enacted laws that make certain matters nonbargainable and, consequently, non-arbitrable.194 Once employee disciplinary matters
become non-bargainable, a public employer has the discretion to decide how to handle
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employee misconduct.195 One approach an employer can take is to forgo progressive
disciplinary proceedings and adopt zero tolerance policies when the employer perceives
that the employee acted in a manner contrary to what society expects of educators.196
Second, the state legislatures can enact laws that make disciplinary matters nonarbitrable, leaving disciplinary matters outside the scope of the arbitration clause in the
CBA.197 This proposal differs from the first because this proposal bars arbitration but
permits the possibility to still bargain employee discipline procedures. For example, both
parties may bargain for and agree that a teacher who engages in sexual misconduct with a
student will be immediately terminated. Because the public employee and employer are
still able to bargain certain measures, the second proposal also allows the parties to retain
their party autonomy.198 One major caveat for this proposal is that a court may overrule a
law that restricts arbitrability pursuant to the federal policy favoring arbitration.199
Third, the state legislatures can enact laws that allow public employers and
employees to bargain and arbitrate employee disciplinary matters but requires that the
arbitrator, and subsequently the courts, consider the best interests of the students when
considering whether to reinstate an educator who has engaged in student-related
misconduct.200 The legislature would have to determine what boundaries are most
appropriate in its jurisdiction. For example, the legislature may decide to include an
enumerated list of misconduct that warrants immediate discharge. The legislatures can also
model their statutes after Massachusetts’s. Massachusetts’s teacher dismissal statute
presents an example that has served to bring the student’s rights to the forefront in these
type of arbitration cases.201 The statute details the procedure that public employers must
follow when discharging the employee.202 The statute also mandates that the arbitrator
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determine whether it is in the “best interests of the pupils” to reinstate a teacher when a
teacher dismissal dispute is at issue in an arbitration proceeding.203
The states’ judiciary branch can follow other jurisdictions and shift its focus to
children’s rights during judicial review of arbitral awards involving educators’ studentrelated misconduct. First, the courts can work independent from, but implicitly in
conjunction with, the legislature by interpreting teacher dismissal statutes using a
children’s rights focus, as required in such statutes. In these cases, the arbitrators exercise
the power to interpret the statute but the courts retain jurisdiction to review the statute’s
meaning de novo204 because courts are equipped with the power to interpret and determine
what the law is.205 Geller and Zagaeski, the two Massachusetts cases, illustrate this second
potential safeguard.206
Second, courts may choose to take a less deferential standard when reviewing
arbitration awards that concern the reinstatement of educators who engaged in studentrelated misconduct.207 Geller illustrates how this safeguard would potentially operate in
practice. In Geller, Judge Ireland explained that in order to consider the best interests of
the students, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts had to be less deferential to arbitration
awards and allocate greater weight to the public policy calling for the protection of children
in schools.208 This safeguard is effective because the court directly considers the risks,
harms, and other consequences that students face after the reinstatement of an educator
who previously engaged in student-related misconduct.
Finally, the courts can hold that public school employee’s disciplinary matters are
managerial or educational public policy matters and thus non-negotiable and nonarbitrable.209 Categorizing disciplinary matters as managerial and as pertaining to
educational public policy prevents the union from bargaining or arbitrating the matter and
allows the employer to retain discretion over employee disciplinary matters.210
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2. Workability and Sustainability of Legislative and Judicial Safeguards
Legislative action is workable and sustainable. Legislative action would be lengthy
during the drafting phase but expedient during execution.211 The process of policy making
varies from state to state because each state is autonomous. In order to draft and pass
legislation that will have the effect of the law, the majority of legislators often need to agree
on the terms.212 The process can be complicated and lengthy because the legislation may
pass through different committees before reaching the Governor’s desk.213 However, once
the legislation is enacted, the statute has a chance of expedient implementation.
Simple mandates are capable of immediate implementation because they do not
require many resources for full compliance.214 Speed limits are an example of simple
mandates. Under these mandates, a driver violates the mandate if the driver drives over the
speed limit.215 Consequences may follow, namely a monetary fine.216 Conversely, to follow
the mandate, the driver need only drive at or below the speed limit. The action does not
require additional resources in order to comply. This example shows that a bright-line rule,
when feasible, can be effective in certain situations. Similarly, state legislatures can enact
laws that clearly prohibit educator disciplinary matters from collective bargaining or
potentially arbitration, or that do not prohibit bargaining or arbitration, but do set
limitations.217 Compliance with these laws would not require any resources besides the
unions’ and the public employers’ recognition that they cannot submit disciplinary issues
to arbitration.
A statute is also highly sustainable over time because once a jurisdiction decides to
enact legislation, the legislation will remain in place until the legislature decides to undergo
the lengthy law-making process to supersede the law with new legislation218 or until a court
declares the legislation defective or inoperative in some way.219
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The judicial safeguards proposed are also workable and sustainable. For example,
in Massachusetts, the court’s heightened focus on the students’ best interests have proven
effective for over a decade after the legislature enacted the teacher dismissal statute.220
B. Public Employer-Employee Reform Oriented Safeguard: Advocating for NonArbitrability of Educator Disciplinary Matters
This section presents two safeguards that are particularly promising. As two
autonomous parties who have the freedom of contract to decide what employment contract
provisions to bargain for and include within the arbitration clauses’ scope,221 the public
employer and employee may choose one of the following proposals without legislative or
judicial action: (1) refrain from bargaining employee disciplinary matters or (2) bargain
disciplinary procedures but refrain from including employee disciplinary matters within
the scope of the arbitration clause. The two options require commitment from both parties
and willingness to curtail some of the current benefits enjoyed222 in order to further the
students’ best interests. Reforms from within, involving the two primary parties, are more
likely to last because union members are more likely to exhibit buy-in when the union
members are part of the policy-making process.223
1. Workability and Sustainability of Internal Safeguards
The proposed safeguards can be difficult to implement. Unions and employers
favor arbitration as a method of alternative dispute resolution because the method provides
expediency, relatively low costs, and expertise.224 A reform from within would require that
one party (or both parties) change his or her view on what furthers his or her self-interests
and focus on what best serves the best interests of the students. Such reform may be
difficult because the approach is contrary to the current approach, where the employer
advocates for the employer’s self-interests and the union advocates for the union members’
interests.225
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To understand the difficulty of implementing an internal reform, consider the
alternatives for both parties. Based on the historical background and current arbitration
trends in public employer-employee relations, if the employer advocates for and succeeds
in not bargaining or arbitrating employee disciplinary matters, the employer will only have
two alternatives: (1) an internal grievance mechanism or (2) the court system.226 An
internal grievance system is desirable from the employer’s perspective but this grievance
process is unlikely to prevail as the chosen mechanism because the union is unlikely to
agree to that term.227 Both parties will likely prefer the first option because the second
option, the court system, can be lengthy and costly. 228 Costs and lengthy procedures may
deter the employer from litigating employee dismissal disputes if the employer considers
the claims too weak to warrant further pursuance.
Union members would also face the same two primary alternatives: (1) use the
internal grievance procedures or (2) file a complaint with the court system. Arbitration
serves as the number one method to ensure fidelity to the arbitration clauses.229 Thus,
neither of the two alternatives may be ideal for educators.230 An internal grievance process
can be implicitly or explicitly biased because the board will likely be composed of the
public employer’s management.231 Because a teacher dismissal grievance places the
teacher in an adversarial position against the employer, an internal grievance procedure can
be intimidating for the educator.232 Bargaining for an internal grievance procedure also
virtually eliminates the employees’ equal bargaining power because in an internal
grievance proceeding the employer has direct control over the creation of the clauses
governing the internal grievance proceeding.233 The union would also have the court
system as an alternative.234 This option may be costly and lengthy, particularly for the
union members who may be less financially stable than the employer and may be less likely
than the employer to have the necessary funds to litigate the matter over protracted periods
of time. The risk of lengthy and costly proceedings may persuade the union to agree to an
internal grievance proceeding, leaving the union members at a disadvantage.
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Though difficult to implement, once implemented, the safeguards (refraining from
bargaining disciplinary matters or bargaining disciplinary matters but refraining from
arbitrating such matters) offer benefits to both parties and ensure long-term sustainability.
The management will not see its managerial powers infringed because the management
will be able to decide on the appropriate methods of discipline, without third party
interference.235 On the other hand, union members can benefit from litigating first, rather
than arbitrating first. A judicial forum affords the right to jury trial.236 This can be
significant for the employees because the jury may be composed of other employees who
are more likely to understand the employee’s position.237 The union would also benefit, as
the union would avoid spending time and money arbitrating, and subsequently spending
additional time and money going to court for judicial review. In other words, having only
the judicial system as an option allows the union to litigate the matter in this forum without
having to first submit the dispute to arbitration. A single proceeding saves time and
money.238 Moreover, a judicial forum allows the employees to perform extensive discovery
and present all relevant material to present a full case.239 These benefits are likely to ensure
sustainability once the public employers and employees adopt the safeguards.
C. Process-Oriented Safeguards: Third Party Representative or Different
Arbitration Focus
Perhaps the strongest, most effective safeguards lie in the arbitral procedure itself.
Arbitration provides benefits for both parties, including education experts in an expedient
and private proceeding as an alternative to a public, potentially lengthy litigation.240
Arbitration can continue to be an integral part of the public employer-employee labor
relations but can be stronger if the arbitrator maintains children’s rights at the forefront in
his or her analysis. Because the primary and secondary education field involves underage
students, who are vulnerable and underdeveloped,241 the arbitration procedure should be
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wary of resolving disputes between public school employers and employees without
considering children’s rights. Arbitration is typically included in CBAs as a final, binding,
and preferred dispute resolution mechanism242 and arbitrators should take a strong stance
for children’s rights because they may be the last arbiter standing between defenseless
children in schools and educators who may be incapable of fostering a safe environment
for the children.
This section presents two main options that would permit arbitrators to incorporate
children’s rights to the forefront of their analysis when determining whether to reinstate an
educator who has engaged in student-related misconduct. First, both parties can choose to
include a third party representative to represent the students’ collective interests. Because
the third-party representative would represent all students collectively in the abstract, both
the employer and employee would likely split the cost of retaining the third-party
representative. One avenue for implementing this safeguard is to have an association or
organization that represents the families, such as a parent-teacher association, choose the
representative. The idea of having a third party represent children is not new. For example,
in states across the United States, guardian ad litems often represent the best interests of
the children in court proceedings involving children.243
Second, the arbitrator can include the children’s well-being as an additional factor
in his or her analysis. Adding an additional factor can occur in several ways. The arbitrator
can derive its authority from the CBA to directly consider the students’ best interests. 244
This option requires that the public employer and employees include in the CBA the
importance of considering the students’ best interests when determining whether to
reinstate a teacher who has engaged in student-related misconduct.245 The arbitrator can
also derive its authority to directly consider the students’ best interests if the school
districts’ school codes and state statutes require that the arbitrator do so, as the state
legislature has done in Massachusetts.246 Finally, the arbitrator can place a greater emphasis
on children’s rights and their best interests when determining whether to reinstate a teacher
who has engaged in student-related misconduct. An arbitrator may be more likely to
consider whether the award will violate public policy because the arbitrator risks having a
court vacate the award as a violation of public policy.247 When determining whether the

242

See Rapp, supra note 22, § 7.08.

Guardian ad litem, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010) (“A person appointed by the court
during the course of litigation, in which an infant or a person mentally incompetent is a party, to represent
and protect the interests of the infant or incompetent.”).
243

244

See generally discussion supra Section III.A.

245

See generally discussion supra Section III.C.

246

See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 42 (LexisNexis 2016); see generally discussion supra Section III.C.

247

See, e.g., Neshaminy Sch. Dist., 2016 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 185, at *20 (holding that the award
violated public policy); Bethel Park Sch. Dist., 55 A.3d at 160-61 (holding that the award violated public
policy).

award violates public policy, the arbitrator has an opportunity to focus on the children’s
rights, placing greater emphasis on the best interests of the students.
1. Workability and Sustainability of the Process-Oriented Safeguards
Both proposals are workable and sustainable, particularly when concerted efforts
are in place. The first proposed safeguard, the addition of a third-party representative,
presents more difficulty to implement than the latter safeguard, the arbitrators’
consideration of children’s rights as an additional factor during arbitral proceedings.
Including a third-party representative will likely require additional costs in the arbitral
proceedings, but the benefits of safeguarding the rights of students offset the costs.
Additionally, both parties may divide the costs equally to decrease party expenses.
A deeper issue with the addition of a third-party representative is the potential
infringement on the parties’ autonomy and contractual relationships.248 A contractual
relationship under a CBA includes only the employer and, collectively, the employees.
Requiring a third party representative only during the arbitral proceeding in essence adds
a non-signatory party to the contractual agreement. Such an addition may be problematic
because parties who did not sign the contract did not partake in the bargaining process and
did not agree to the final terms. However, the non-signatory party in this situation will
participate in the arbitral proceeding and will likely offer viewpoints on the original CBA
provisions. The parties may perceive the addition of the non-signatory party as an
infringement of their autonomy to negotiate the CBA terms in accordance to their
individual intents or objectives.
Other questions may surge as well. For example, when should the parties decide
who will serve as a third party representing the children’s interests? And, what role, if any,
do the children have in deciding who represents their interests? As a starting point, school
districts that choose to implement this safeguard can model the third party representative’s
role after familiar roles, such as guardian ad litems who often represent the interests of
children in court proceedings. School districts can also seek community input in order to
adopt a safeguard supported by the district and families.
The second safeguard, the arbitrator’s consideration of children’s rights as an
additional factor during the arbitral proceeding, is a no-cost option that brings children’s
rights to the forefront of the analysis. However, an arbitrator derives his or her authority
from the CBA and is bound by statutory limitations.249 Hence, this second safeguard
requires concerted efforts in order to remain sustainable. Concerted efforts may include,
for example, that the states’ legislatures enact laws that require that the arbitrators consider
children’s rights during arbitral proceedings.250 Other concerted efforts may also include
that the public employers and employees indicate explicitly that they prefer that the
arbitrators consider the children’s rights during arbitral proceedings. These efforts will
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allow arbitrators to consider the children’s rights as an additional factor during the arbitral
proceedings, while deriving the authority to do so from the CBA and within statutory
limitations. If thoughtfully chosen and implemented, any of the safeguards can be workable
and sustainable over time.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Children’s rights have remained largely ignored in the public school labor relations
context. Yet, children can be the vulnerable, third-party recipients of consequences
following the reinstatement of an educator who engaged in student-related misconduct.251
Public employee disciplinary matters may be arbitrable, allowing both the employer and
employee to submit to final, binding arbitration. During the arbitration process, arbitrators
often focus their analyses on the contractual language of the CBAs.252 If the arbitral awards
come within the purview of the courts, the courts remain largely deferential toward these
arbitral awards. The courts will likely consider whether the awards violate public policy
but the analyses are rarely direct analyses of the children’s rights.253 Jurisdictions in which
public employees’ disciplinary matters are arbitrable, should adopt legislative, judicial,
employer-employee, and arbitration-process driven safeguards.254 These safeguards will
help ensure that children’s rights remain at the forefront in the public school labor relations
context when an educator has engaged in student-related misconduct.255
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